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EDITOR'S NOTE
In our modem administrative state, where government increasingly at-
tempts to attach "strings" to the benefits we receive, the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions appears on its face to be an effective tool to con-
strain government attempts to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. Instanc-
es of unconstitutional government conditions, to which the doctrine might
properly be applied, arise in numerous and diverse contexts. And yet, despite
its ubiquitous nature, no consensus has emerged for a coherent analytical
framework or unifying theory that would explain and predict the courts' utili-
zation of the doctrine. Thus, as evidenced by its limited and inconsistent ap-
plication by the courts, and the frustrated writings of legal scholars, including
those participating in this symposium, the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions remains an enigma.
In light of the far reaching effects of the doctrine, we designed the sym-
posium to bring together a small group of scholars from different areas of
legal study to consider and compare its application within various contexts.
This symposium issue is therefore divided into four distinct sections, each
representing a particular discipline or point of view. The first section offers
unique perspectives on the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in the con-
text of property. The second section provides one commentator's view of the
doctrine as it relates to religion. The third section contains intriguing thoughts
on the doctrine within the contexts of welfare and reproductive rights. The
fourth and final section entertains the pessimistic but perhaps realistic view
that the doctrine is "too hard," and therefore deserves no consideration at all.
Although the symposium provided no solutions to the unconstitutional condi-
tions conundrum, it did allow for provocative ideas, a lively debate, and in-
sightful commentary, all of which is (hopefully) reflected in this issue.
I thank Dean Dennis Lynch and the participating faculty at the University
of Denver College of Law, particularly Alan Chen, Roberto Corrada, Nancy
Ehrenreich, Martha Ertman, and Julie Nice. Their energy and commitment to
this symposium prompted what I hope to be a long tradition of inspired intel-
lectual debate at the University of Denver and in the pages of the Law Review.
I also thank Bart Johnson, Kelly Elefant, Brent Warkentine, and the editors
and staff of the Denver University Law Review. Finally, I would like to thank
Sue Chrisman, without whom my law school career might never have ended.
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